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1 Introduction
One of the principal concerns of any firm is to configure the supply of intermediate goods
essential to its production. Of late, with the liberalization of trade and the lowering of
barriers to entry, supply chain configurations have assumed global proportions. Indeed, in
several industries, it has become the trend for firms to cut across national boundaries and
outsource their supplies “offshore”, provided the economic lure is strong enough. Many
diverse factors influence firms’ decisions. First, of course, there is the immediate cost of
procuring the goods which—other things being equal—firms invariably seek to minimize.
Then there is the question of risk: a firm may be unwilling to commit itself to a single party
and instead spread its orders among others, even if they happen to be costlier, in order
to ensure a steady flow of inputs. Sometimes a firm may tie up with a broad spectrum
of suppliers so as to increase its access to the latest technological innovation, which could
be forthcoming from any one of them. There can arise situations when a firm is impelled
to select suppliers that will be strategic allies in its endeavor to penetrate newly emerging
markets. For the analyses of these and other factors, and how they impinge on firms’
decisions, see, e.g., Jarillo (1993), Spiegel (1993), Vidal and Goetschalkx (1997), Domberger
(1998), Aggarwal (2003), Shy and Stenbacka (2003) and Chen et al. (2004).
One intriguing possibility that has been alluded to, but not much explored, is that strate-
gic incentives may arise in an oligopoly which outweigh other considerations and play the
pivotal role in firms’ selection of suppliers. Instances of this are presented by Jarillo and
Domberger, of which we recount only two.
The first case comes from Germany. AEG1 used to be a traditional supplier to both
BMW2 and Mercedes Benz. At some point, with a view to vertical integration, Mercedes
Benz acquired AEG. This caused BMW to look for a different supplier, despite the inevitable
extra costs of the switch (see p. 67, Jarillo, 1993).
The second case involves General Electric (GE) in the United States. In the early 1980’s,
GE investigated the possibility of outsourcing its lower brand microwave ovens from outside,
since these had become too costly to manufacture at its factory in Maryland. Discussions
were first held with, and even trial orders given to, Matsushita which happened to be a major
rival of GE and also the world leader for this product in terms of both volume and technology.
But ultimately GE turned to Samsung, then a small company with little experience in
microwaves. The strategy entailed additional costs, such as sending American engineers to
Korea, but it worked well for GE (see, pp. 84-86, Jarillo, 1993; and also Case Study 6.2, p.
108, Domberger, 1998).
Such case studies clearly point to the need for a game-theoretic analysis. In this paper
we bring to light a scenario in which the outsourcing patterns emerge out of the strategic
competition between firms. We find that it is typically not the case that a firm will outsource
supplies to its rivals. There are two distinct reasons for this. The first is based on increasing
returns to scale: if a firm places a sizeable order with its rival, it significantly lowers the
rival’s costs on account of the increasing returns, and this stands to its detriment in the
ensuing competition on the final product. Thus the firm is led to outsource to others who
may be costlier but, being out of the final product market, do not pose the threat of future
1Allgemeine Deutsche Electricita¨tsgesellschaft
2Bayerische Motoren Werke (or, Bavarian Motor Works)
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competition. The second reason is more subtle and persists even in the case of constant
returns to scale (i.e., linear costs)—indeed, it comes to the fore in this case. It is the main
focus of this paper.
To be precise, suppose there are firms N competing in the market for a final product α.
Intermediate goods η are critical inputs in the production of α, but only some of the firms
I ⊂ N have the competence to manufacture η at reasonable cost. The other firms J ≡ N\I
must obtain η from elsewhere. One possibility is to outsource η to their rivals in I. But there
is also a fringe of firms O on the “outside” which can manufacture η. What distinguishes
O from I is that no firm in O can enter the market for the final product α. (This could
be because it lacks the technology to convert η to α, or else faces high set-up costs—and,
possibly, other barriers to entry—in the market α.3) To keep matters simple, we consider a
purely linear model, i.e., in which the costs of production for both η and α are linear; as is
the market demand for α.
Our main result is that, in this scenario, strategic considerations can come into play that
will cause the firms in J to outsource η (outside) to O rather than (inside) to I, even if the
costs of manufacturing η are higher in O than in I, so long as they are not much higher.
The intuition goes roughly as follows and is best seen when I and J consist of single firms
and the outside fringe O is a competitive sector whose members simply quote their cost as
the price at which they will provide the intermediate good. (Thus O has no strategic role
here. However, we show that our results remain intact when O is taken to be strategic,
indeed a monopolist,4 though at the cost of a more complicated analysis.) Suppose (i) I and
J are Cournot duopolists which compete in the market for the final product α; (ii) I and O
can produce the intermediate good η, but J cannot; and (iii) O cannot enter the market for
α. Thus J must decide how to allocate its order of η between I and O, and then how much of
it to use in the production of α, freely disposing of the unused portion of η. We show that the
optimal course of action for J is to outsource exclusively to either I or O, never to both, and
to use the entire input to produce α. (Thus, in equilibrium, free disposal will not be availed
of even though it is permitted.) Now if J outsources to I, then I immediately knows the
amount outsourced. This has the effect of establishing J as leader in the Stackelberg game
that ensues in the market for α, in which I is forced to become the follower. In contrast, if
J outsources to O then—thanks to the sanctity of the secrecy clause—I will only know that
J has struck a deal with O but not the quantity that J has outsourced. Thus I and J will
remain Cournot duopolists in the ensuing game on market α.
If costs for manufacturing η do not vary too much between I and O, then I will earn less
as a Stackelberg follower than as a Cournot duopolist. This will tempt I to push J towards
O by quoting so high a price for the intermediate good η that, in spite of the premium that
3In particular, think of the following set-up. The market for α is concentrated in the “developed world”.
The firms in O, on the other hand, are located offshore in the “developing world” and can manufacture η but
lack the (advanced) technology for converting η to α. Even if some of them were to make the technological
breakthrough, they would face not just the standard set-up costs for penetrating the market α, but further
barriers to entry that pertain to foreign firms. This international setting perhaps makes our hypothesis of
an outside fringe O more viable. But we do not need it, and all we formally postulate is the existence of this
fringe.
4The moment O has two or more (identical) firms, Bertrand competition will bring the price they quote
down to the level of their cost and O will in effect be a competitive sector. (Note that we postulate linear
costs and unbounded capacity). Thus, within the parameters of our model, O can be strategic only if it is a
monopolist.
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J is willing to pay for the privilege of being the leader, J prefers to go to O. The temptation
can only be resisted if it is feasible for I to provide η at such an exorbitant price that it can
recoup as provider what it loses as follower. But such an exorbitant price is undercut by
the competitive price prevailing at O, as long as O’s costs are not too much higher than I’s.
The upshot is that in any subgame-perfect pure5 strategy Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the
game, J will outsource to O.
Which subgame gets played between I and J on market α—Cournot or Stackelberg—is
thus not apriori fixed, but endogenous to equilibrium. This is all the more striking since, in
our overall game, the option is open for firm J to outsource to both I and O and to thus bring
any “mixture” of the Stackelberg and Cournot games into play. The logic of the SPNE rules
out mixing and shows that only one of the two pure games will occur along the equilibrium
play.
Worthy of note is the fact that it is not J who has the “primary” strategic incentive to
outsource to O. This incentive resides with I who is anxious to ward off J and force J to
turn to O. The anxiety gets played out when O does not have a severe cost disadvantage
compared to J. Otherwise, I is happy to strike a deal with J since it can get high provider
prices that compensate it for becoming a follower. That inside firms would want to provide
inputs to their competitors at high prices is quite common and has been commented on (e.g.,
Hart and Tirole, 1990; Ordover et al., 1990; Rey and Tirole, 2006). What is surprising in our
scenario is that high prices are quoted not to earn revenue at the expense of the competitor
but instead to ward it off and compel it to seek its supply elsewhere.
The actual argument is more intricate and the exact result is presented in Section 4. As
was said, there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for the outside firm O. In fact,
we suppose that O has a higher cost than I for manufacturing η. Our main result states that,
if O’s cost does not exceed a well-defined threshold, J will outsource to O in any SPNE.
Our formal model is as follows. The market for the intermediate good η meets first,
followed by duopolistic competition between I and J on the final good α. Since the outside
competitive fringe O stands ready to supply η at its cost price, firm I must counter this
with a price quote of its own for η. Then both firms I and J, seeing these prices, decide
how much of η to outsource to I and to O. The outsourcing orders are subject to a secrecy
clause, which is tantamount to I and J placing their orders simultaneously. The only act
that could destroy the simultaneity is a preliminary announcement by I of the quantity of η
it intends to produce (outsource to itself). But, in the absence of an external enforcement
agency, such an announcement would not constitute a credible commitment and would be
like “cheap talk” which can be ignored. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 6.1.
The secrecy clause is crucial for our analysis. It can be upheld on the simple ground
that it is routinely seen in practice (see, e.g., Temponi and Lambert, 2001; Ravenhill, 2003;
Hoecht and Trott, 2006) and it is often a legally binding provision (see, e.g., Khalfan, 2004;
Vagadia, 2007). The evidence supporting the secrecy clause is discussed in Section 6.2.
Moreover we give a plausibility argument that, in certain scenarios, it holds endogenously in
equilibrium.
It must also be pointed out that our model is one-shot (corresponding to discounting
the future very heavily if one were to think of a multi-period setting) and in effect all
goods are perishable. With a long time horizon, durable goods and players who are patient,
5Throughout our analysis, we confine ourselves to pure strategies.
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other kinds of SPNE would surely emerge. All these considerations—possibility of credible
commitments, breakdown of the secrecy clause, long time horizon—are clearly important
issues but lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Our analysis indicates that firms which position themselves on the “outside”, by not
entering the market for the final product, are more likely to attract orders for intermediate
goods. There is some evidence that this can happen in practice. By the mid-1980’s (see
Ravenhill, 2003), US companies in the electronics industry were looking “to diversify their
sources of supply” in order to fare better against their Japanese competitors. Malaysia and
Singapore made a strong bid to get the US business. A key feature of the government policies
of both nations was that “they were not attempting to promote national champions in the
electronic industry”, but the objective was rather “to build a complementary supply base,
not to create local rivals that might displace foreign producers”. Their success in becoming
major supply hubs for electronic components is well documented. Of course it is true that
they had the advantage of low-cost skilled labor. But what we wish to underscore is their
deliberate and well-publicized abstention from markets for the final products, which by itself
gave them a competitive edge. To reiterate this implication of our analysis in more ambitious
terms: the current widespread trend of outsourcing to offshore locations may well persist for
strategic reasons, even if offshore costs were to rise, so long as the offshore companies abstain
from the final product markets of their clients.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section 2. The
model is presented in Section 3. The main result, together with an intuitive outline of
its proof, is described in Section 4. It holds in both scenarios, whether the outside firm
is strategic or part of a competitive fringe. The formal proof of the main result (modulo
some technical lemmas) is presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses some extensions and
variations of the model.
2 Related literature
Outsourcing of inputs is such an important and widespread phenomenon that it has been
studied from various points of view. First, it can be driven by cost considerations or by
differences in productivity across firms (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Antra`s and
Helpman, 2004; and the references therein). A second argument is based on niche markets.
A firm may be attracted to an exclusive outsourcing contract with a supplier who can provide
highly specialized inputs, in order to market a differentiated final product that limits the
intensity of price competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). There are explanations based on
economies of scale. It is cost-effective to outsource inputs instead of undertaking redundant
investment of one’s own, all the more so if one’s rivals have already gone to an outsider and
created the scale there (Shy and Stenbacka, 2003). Even when the rival is doing in-house
production, there is pressure to outsource because placing orders with the rival will only
enhance its economies of scale and lower its costs, making it a more formidable competitor
in the final goods market (Chen and Dubey, 2009). Another rationale for outsourcing is based
on imperfect competition in the input markets. By outsourcing orders with a supplier to
which its rival has already gone, a firm accomplishes two things: first, it raises the input price,
which softens the competition in the final goods market and can generate a net gain (Buehler
and Haucap, 2006); second, it prevents the rival from extracting monopolistic benefits from
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the supplier (Arya et al., 2008a). Another line of argument in favor of outsourcing runs as
follows. A vertically integrated provider, which competes in the final product market, will
have incentive to “hold up” its supply once investments have been sunk in the procurement
process (Heavner, 2004). Furthermore there is the considerable risk that the business plans
of the input-seeking firm will get revealed to its rival via the orders placed. On both counts,
it is safer for the firm to outsource inputs to an outsider.
Of course, the other side of the story has also been discussed. If a negotiated agreement
can be reached to share the gains, it could become optimal to order inputs from a rival
(Spiegel, 1993). Indeed trade of intermediate goods may enable rivals to collude, via con-
tractual agreements based on that trade, and thereby sustain a high price in the downstream
market for the final product (Chen 2001; Chen et al., 2004; Arya et al., 2008b).
Each of these explanations clearly has its own merit, but our purpose here is to bring a
new strategic consideration to the fore which can sometimes be critical to firms’ behavior. To
this end, we present a stripped-down model in which none of the factors above are present.
There are no cost benefits, comparative advantage, niche markets, economies of scale or
possibility of collusion; nor is there reluctance in the firm to reveal its business plans to the
provider. On the contrary, the strategic competition in our model creates incentive for the
input-seeking firm to fully reveal its plans to the vertically integrated rival, with the intent of
becoming Stackelberg leader in the final product market. It is the rival who, seeing through
this ploy, refuses to play the role of the input provider and drives the firm to outsource
elsewhere.
There is also considerable literature on endogenous Stackelberg leadership.6 The paper
most closely related to ours, and inviting immediate comparison, is Baake et al (1999). They
consider a duopoly model to examine what they call “cross-supplies” within an industry—in
our parlance, this is the phenomenon that a firm outsources to its rival. The “endogenous
Stackelberg effect” is indeed pointed out by them: firm A, upon accepting the order out-
sourced by its rival B, automatically becomes a Stackelberg follower in the ensuing game
on the final markets. But there are set-up costs of production in their model, and provided
these costs are high enough, A can charge B a sufficiently high price so as to be compensated
for being a follower. The upshot is that cross-supplies can be sustained in SPNE.
There are several points of difference between their model and ours. First, their argument
relies crucially on the presence of sufficiently strong economies of scale (set-up costs). If these
are absent or weak, there is no outsourcing in SPNE in their model. In contrast, in our model,
outsourcing occurs purely on account of the endogenous Stackelberg effect (recall that we
have constant returns to scale7). Second, outsourcing occurs only in some of their SPNE:
there always coexist other SPNE where it does not occur. In our model, the outsourcing is
invariant across all SPNE. In short, they show that outsourcing can occur, while we show
that it must. Third, it is critical for their result that there be no outside suppliers.8 Such
suppliers would generate competition that would make it infeasible for A to charge a high
price to B, invalidating their result. In our model, the situation is different. We allow for
both kinds of suppliers: those that are inside as potential rivals and others that are outside.
It turns out that increasing the number of either type leaves our result intact (see Section
6E.g., Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Robson (1990), Mailath (1993), Pal (1996), van Damme and Hurkens
(1999)—in all of which the timing of entry by firms is viewed as strategic.
7Though outsourcing is further boosted by economies of scale in our model. See Section 6.5.
8Recall that these are suppliers who are not present as rivals in the final product market.
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6.5). Finally—and this, to our mind, is the most salient difference—the economic phenomena
depicted in Baake et al. and here are different, indeed almost complementary. In Baake et
al., the issue is to figure out when a firm will outsource to its rival. Here we consider precisely
the opposite scenario and pinpoint conditions under which a firm will turn away from its
rival and outsource instead to an outsider, even if the outsider happens to have a costlier
technology. The fact that both models take cognizance of the endogenous Stackelberg effect
is a technical—albeit interesting—point. What is significant is that this effect is embedded
in disparate models and utilized to explain complementary economic phenomena.
3 The model
We shall first present Model 1 in which O is a strategic monopolist and then Model 2 where
O is a competitive sector. The reason for this order is mathematical brevity: Model 2 can
immediately be derived from Model 1 by the simple expedient of setting O’s provider price
equal to its cost.
Model 1: strategic outside firm
For ease of notation, we substitute 0, 1, 2 for O, I, J. As was said, firms 1 and 2 are duopolists
in the market for a final good α. An intermediate good η is required to produce α. Firm 1
can manufacture η, but 2 cannot. There is an “outside” firm 0 which can also manufacture
η. What distinguishes 0 from 1 is that 0 cannot enter the market for the final good α. Firm
0’s sole means of profit is the manufacture of good η for the “inside” firms 1 and 2.
Let x1 and x2 be the respective quantities of α produced by firms 1 and 2, and P (.) be
the price of α. The inverse market demand for good α is as follows where a is a positive
constant.
P (x1 + x2) = a− x1 − x2 if x1 + x2 < a and P (x1 + x2) = 0 otherwise (1)
The constant marginal cost of production of good η is c0 for 0 and c1 for 1. Furthermore
both 1 and 2 can convert one unit of good η into one unit of good α at the (for simplicity)
same constant marginal cost, which w.l.o.g we normalize to zero. We assume
0 < c1 < c0 < (a+ c1)/2 (2)
The condition c1 < c0 gives a cost disadvantage to the outside firm 0 and loads the dice
against good η being sourced to it. As (a + c1)/2 is the monopoly price under cost c1, the
inequality c0 < (a+ c1)/2 prevents firm 1 from automatically becoming a monopolist in the
market for good α.
The extensive form game between the three firms is completely specified by the parame-
ters c1, c0, a and so we shall denote it Γ(c0, c1, a). For i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, 2}, let
qij ≡ quantity of good η outsourced by firm j to firm i and
xj ≡ quantity of good α supplied by firm j.
The game Γ(c0, c1, a) is played as follows.
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Stage I: Firms 0 and 1 simultaneously and publicly announce prices p0 and p1 at which
they are ready to provide good η.
Stage II: For every (p0, p1), firms 1 and 2 play the two-stage game G(p0, p1) where
Stage 1: Firm 2 chooses q12 (quantity of η to order from firm 1 at price p1).
Stage 2: For every (p0, p1, q
1
2), 1 and 2 play the simultaneous-move game G(p0, p1, q
1
2) where
1. Firm 1 chooses q01 (quantity of η to order from firm 0 at price p0), q
1
1 (quantity of η to
produce by itself at cost c1) and x1 (quantity of α to put up in the final goods market)
subject to:
(i) q01 + q
1
1 ≥ q12 (the total amount of η is at least q12 so that it is able to honor its
commitment to supply q12 units of η to firm 2) and (ii) x1 ≤ q01 + q11 − q12 (quantity of α
must be producible from the amount of η left on hand after fulfilling the order of firm 2).
Note that “≤” is tantamount to allowing free disposal of the intermediate good (input).9
2. Firm 2 chooses q02 (quantity of η to order from firm 0 at price p0) and x2 (quantity of
α to put up in the final goods market) subject to x2 ≤ q02 + q12 (quantity of α must be
producible from the total η it has ordered).
It remains to describe the payoffs of the three firms at the terminal nodes of the game tree.
Any such node is specified by p ≡ (p0, p1), q ≡ {qij}i=0,1j=1,2 and x ≡ (x1, x2). For i = 0, 1, 2, the
payoff pii(p, q) of firm i is given by
pi0(p, q) = p0(q
0
1 + q
0
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from η
− c0(q01 + q02)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of η
pi1(p, q, x) = P (x1 + x2)x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from α
+ p1q
1
2︸︷︷︸
revenue from η
− (p0q01 + c1q11)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of η
and
pi2(p, q, x) = P (x1 + x2)x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from α
− (p0q02 + p1q12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of η
This completes the description of the game Γ(c0, c1, a).
Remark (On the Timing of Moves) We have supposed in our game that firm 2 chooses
q12 in stage II(1) after finding out p0, p1 announced in stage I; and that subsequently it chooses
q02, x2 in stage II(2) but without knowing anything further than p0, p1, q
1
2. This is entirely
equivalent to choosing q12, q
0
2, x2 simultaneously in stage II(1) after finding out p0, p1.
But for firm 1, the timing we have described is important. Firm 1 chooses q01, q
1
1, x1 after
finding out the order q12 placed by firm 2. This timing is logically necessary. Were firm 1
to announce q01, q
1
1, x1 before knowing q
1
2, it could always renege on its announcement and
choose a new q˜01, q˜
1
1, x˜1 after knowing q
1
2. Due to the secrecy clause, firm 2 does not even
know if and when firm 1 has gone to 0, leave aside the quantity q01 it has ordered. As for q
1
1
and x1, these are known to firm 1 alone. Thus firm 1 has the full power to revise q
0
1, q
1
1, x1.
In the absence of binding contracts, which could be written before a third party such as a
courthouse empowered to enforce it, the prior announcement of q01, q
1
1, x1 by firm 1 does not
constitute a credible commitment and has no effect (see Section 6.1).
9We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we formally incorporate free disposal in our model.
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Model 2: competitive outside fringe
For contrast, and to gain better perspective, we shall consider a variant10 Model 2 in which
O is a competitive fringe of many outside firms. In this scenario we may take the choice
made by a representative firm 0 of O to be p0 ≡ c0 (so that Π0 ≡ 0). Thus firm 0 is in
effect a “strategic dummy” and we wind up with strategic competition only between firms
1 and 2. We denote this game Γ˜(c0, c1, a). The formal mathematical definition of Γ˜(c0, c1, a)
is exactly the same as that of Γ(c0, c1, a) except that we take p0 ≡ c0 to be an exogenously
fixed constant. We seek to find subgame-perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of
Γ(c0, c1, a) and Γ˜(c0, c1, a). Henceforth we shall often denote the games by simply Γ and Γ˜.
4 The main result
Our main result asserts that if the cost disadvantage of the outside firm 0 is not too significant
(i.e. c0 − c1 is not too large), then there is outsourcing to 0 in any SPNE of both Γ and Γ˜.
The Main Result (Strategic outside firm or competitive outside fringe) There is
a threshold θ̂(c1) ∈ (c1, (a + c1)/2) such that if c0 ∈ (c1, θ̂(c1)), then in any SPNE of either
Γ or Γ˜, firm 2 orders η exclusively from the outside firm 0.
Observe that when c0 ∈ (c1, θ̂), firm 0 has a cost disadvantage compared to firm 1, yet 2
outsources η to 0 rather than to 1. Strategic considerations dominate firms’ behavior here.
To keep these strategic incentives in the foreground, we have assumed in the paper that
c0 > c1.
11 The main result is also summarized in Figure 1 below, in which c0 is varied on
the horizontal axis, holding a and c1 fixed.
Figure 1: SPNE of Γ(c0, c1, a) and Γ˜(c0, c1, a)
This figure confirms our claim that outsourcing to offshore locations will persist for
strategic reasons, even if offshore costs rise moderately so long as the offshore companies
abstain from the final product markets of their clients.
4.1 SPNE of Γ and Γ˜: The detailed characterization
In this section we fully characterize the SPNE of Γ in Theorem 1 and of Γ˜ in Theorem 2.
These two theorems together furnish the technical details of the main result. To enunciate
them simply it will be useful to first state the following (intuitively credible) lemma:
10We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this variant.
11Below this interval, when c0 ≤ c1, 0 has a cost advantage over 1 and so 2 even more readily outsourced
to 0; in fact, for small enough c0, both 1 and 2 outsource to 0.
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Lemma 1 In any SPNE of Γ or Γ˜, we must have (i) p0 ≥ c1 and (ii) q01 = 0 (firm 1 does
not outsource to firm 0).
Proof (i) For Γ˜, we have p0 ≡ c0 > c1, so consider Γ and suppose p0 < c1. Since c1 < c0, firm
0 makes (p1 − c0) < 0 dollars per unit of the total outsourced order q01 + q02 that it receives.
If it could be shown that q01 + q
0
2 > 0, there would be an immediate contradiction, because
firm 0 can in fact ensure zero payoff by deviating from p0 to some sufficiently high p
′
0 (e.g.,
p′0 > a), at which price neither firm will outsource anything to it.
To complete the proof, we now show that q01 + q
0
2 > 0.
Let q02 = 0 (otherwise we are done). If x2 > 0, we must have q
1
2 > 0. Then, since p0 < c1,
1 will pass on this order to 0, i.e., q01 > 0.
If x2 = 0, then, as is easily verified, x1 > 0, i.e., q
0
1 + q
1
1 > 0. But the cost of producing
q01 + q
1
1 is p0q
0
1 + c1q
1
1. Since p0 < c1, optimality requires that q
1
1 = 0, so q
0
1 > 0.
(ii) It is clear by that if p0 > c1, then firm 1 will choose q
0
1 = 0. If p0 = c1 < c0 and
q01 > 0, then firm 0 obtains a negative payoff. As it can ensure a zero payoff by quoting a
sufficiently high price, we must have q01 = 0. 
By Lemma 1, in any SPNE play of Γ or Γ˜, firm 1’s constant marginal cost is c1. Before
describing the results formally, it will be useful to summarize five main features of an SPNE
which capture the essential strategic interactions in our model (and whose formal proofs, are
in Section 5).
(i) Exclusive order of η by firm 2: For the game G(p0, p1) that follows the announcement
(p0, p1) (for Γ˜, p0 ≡ c0), firm 2 orders η exclusively either from firm 1 at price p1 (i.e. q02 = 0)
or from firm 0 at price p0 (i.e. q
1
2 = 0).
(ii) No wastage of η: Every unit of η ordered by firm 2 is completely utilized to supply
α, i.e., q01 + q
0
2 = x2. For firm 1, every unit of η that it produces is completely utilized either
to supply α or to provide η to firm 2, i.e., q11 = q
1
2 + x1.
(iii) Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes: If 2 orders η from 1, the amount q12 has a com-
mitment value prior to the play of the ensuing game G(p0, p1, q
1
2) which establishes 2 as the
Stackelberg leader in market α. If 2 orders η from 0, then 1 and 2 stay as Cournot duopolists.
Accordingly, one of the following duopoly games is played in market α, where firm 1’s unit
cost is always c1.
• K(p0): the Cournot duopoly with firms 1, 2 where 2 has unit cost p0,
• S(p1): the Stackelberg duopoly with firm 2 as the leader and firm 1 the follower where 2
has unit cost p1.
Let (k1(p0), k2(p0)) be the quantities of firms 1 and 2 in the unique NE of K(p0) and
(s˜1(p1), s˜2(p1)) be the quantities in the unique SPNE of S(p1). Define the constrained leader
and follower outputs12 as
s2(p1) := min{s˜2(p1), k2(0)} and s1(p1) := max{s˜1(p1), k1(0)}
12Firm 2 cannot use its order q12 to gain unlimited leadership advantage from firm 1. If 2 chooses q
1
2 > k2(0)
(firm 2’s Cournot output when it has the minimum possible cost 0), its order ceases to have any commitment
value. For this reason, if the Stackelberg leader output s˜2(p1) exceeds k2(0), it is optimal for 2 to choose
x2 = k2(0) to exercise a limited leadership position.
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In the game G(p0, p1), (a) the Cournot outcome is played if (x1, x2) = (k1(p0), k2(p0)) and
(b) the Stackelberg outcome is played if (x1, x2) = (s1(p1), s2(p1)).
(iv) Leadership premium for firm 2: Let φ2(p0) and L(p1) be firm 2’s profits in K(p0) and
S(p1). Whether 2 prefers the Cournot or the Stackelberg outcome depends on its unit costs
at these two duopolies. If p1 ≤ p0, then clearly 2 would prefer to be the Stackelberg leader
rather than a Cournot duopolist. Even if p1 > p0, 2 would still prefer to be the leader as
long as p1 is not too large, that is, firm 2 is willing to pay a premium in terms of higher cost
to be the leader. There is a continuous and increasing function τ(p0) that represents this
leadership premium, i.e.,
L(p1) T φ2(p0)⇔ p1 S τ(p0) (3)
If (p0, p1) is part of an SPNE of Γ, then p1 = τ(p0), making firm 2 just indifferent between
the Cournot and the Stackelberg outcomes.13 Due to this, to identify SPNE it is useful to
define for any interval [u, v] ⊆ [c1, (a+ c1)/2],
(Graph τ)[u, v] ≡ {(p0, p1)|p0 ∈ [u, v], p1 = τ(p0)}
Figure 2 portrays (Graph τ)[u, v].
Figure 2: (Graph τ)[u, v]
(v) Threshold for regime change: Let φ1(p0) and f(p1) be firm 1’s profits in market α in
K(p0) and S(p1). Under the Cournot outcome, firm 1 receives no order of η from firm 2 (i.e.
q12 = 0), so firm 1’s payoff is simply φ1(p0). Under the Stackelberg outcome, firm 2 orders
its required η exclusively from firm 1 (i.e. q12 = s2(p1)), so 1 obtains (p1 − c1)s2(p1) from
market η and its payoff is F (p1) = f(p1) + (p1− c1)s2(p1). Taking p1 = τ(p0), firm 1 obtains
F (τ(p0)) if the Stackelberg outcome is played. There is a constant θ̂(c1) that represents the
13The reason is if firm 2 strictly prefers one of these outcomes, the firm that is supplying η to 2 at that
outcome can improve its payoff by slightly raising the price of η. This result does not necessarily hold for
the game Γ˜ as firm 0 has no strategic role there.
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threshold for regime change14 for firm 1 as follows:
φ1(p0) T F (τ(p0))⇔ p0 S θ̂ (4)
Thus, firm 1 prefers the Cournot outcome if and only if p0 ≤ θ̂. Regarding firm 0, it receives
no order under the Stackelberg outcome, so it obtains zero payoff there. Under the Cournot
outcome, q02 = k2(p0), so firm 0 obtains (p0 − c0)k2(p0). Thus, firm 0 prefers the Cournot
outcome if and only if p0 ≥ c0. By the Nash Equilibrium reasoning, it follows that the
Cournot outcome is played in an SPNE only when both 0 and 1 prefer this outcome, which
is the case if and only if c0 ≤ θ̂. On the other hand, the Stackelberg outcome is played in an
SPNE only when both 0 and 1 prefer this outcome, which is the case if and only if c0 ≥ θ̂.
Theorem 1 (Strategic outside firm) There is a threshold θ̂(c1) ∈ (c1, (a + c1)/2) such
that, in the game Γ the following hold.
(I) If c0 ∈ (c1, θ̂), there is a continuum of SPNE, indexed by supplier prices (p0, p1) ∈
(Graph τ)[c0, θ̂]. For any such (p0, p1), firm 2 outsources η to the outside firm 0 and
the Cournot outcome is played in G(p0, p1), i.e., q
1
2 = 0, q
1
1 = x1 = k1(p0) and q
0
2 =
x2 = k2(p0).
(II) If c0 ∈ (θ̂, (a + c1)/2), there is a continuum of SPNE, indexed by supplier prices
(p0, p1) ∈ (Graph τ)[θ̂, c0]. For any such (p0, p1), firm 2 outsources η to firm 1 and the
Stackelberg outcome is played in G(p0, p1), i.e., q
0
2 = 0, q
1
1 = q
1
2 + x1, q
1
2 = x2 = s2(p1)
and x1 = s1(p1).
(III) Finally, if c0 = θ̂, there are two SPNE with the same supplier prices (p0, p1) =
(c0, τ(c0)) . In the first SPNE firm 2 outsources η to 0 and the Cournot outcome is
played in G(p0, p1); in the the second SPNE firm 2 outsources η to 1 and the Stackelberg
outcome is played.
Proof See Section 5. 
Essentially the same qualitative result can be stated for Model 2 (the game Γ˜(c1, c0, a)),
with some obvious modifications spelled out below. First, a little terminology. We say that
two SPNE are “equivalent in real terms” if they only differ in the provider prices quoted
by the firm to which nothing is outsourced. In other words, the two SPNE must have the
same quantities q ≡ {qij}i=0,1j=1,2, and also the same prices except perhaps the provider price pi
(i = 0, 1) at which there is no outsourced order (i.e., qi1 + q
i
2 = 0).
Theorem 2 (Competitive outside fringe) There is a threshold θ̂(c1) ∈ (c1, (a + c1)/2)
(same as is Theorem 1 with the strategic outside firm) such that, in the game Γ˜ the following
hold.
(I) Same as Theorem 1 except that p1 ∈ [τ(c0),∞) and the continuum of SPNE are
equivalent in real terms.
14Both τ(p0) and θ̂(c1), which occur in the statements of Theorems 1 and 2, have simple closed-form
formulae in terms of the exogenous parameters a, c0, c1 of the model, and are presented in the Appendix in
the end of this paper. They may appear cryptic, but are required for the sake of completeness. (See section
5 for their derivation and justification.)
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(II) Same as Theorem 1 except that the continuum of SPNE collapses to a unique SPNE
with p1 = τ(c0).
(III) Finally, if c0 = θ̂, there is a continuum of SPNE. In one of these, p1 = τ(c0) and firm
2 outsources η to firm 1. The rest are indexed by p1 ∈ [τ(c0),∞), are equivalent in real
terms and have firm 2 outsourcing to firm 0.
Proof See Section 5. 
4.2 Intuitive outline of the proof
Though the formal proof is in the Web Appendix, and entails some necessary technical
computations, its heuristic is quite straightforward and goes as follows. We apply backward
induction to determine SPNE of Γ and Γ˜. We therefore begin from stage II(2) of these games.
Here p0, p1, q
1
2 are given and firms 1, 2 play the simultaneous-move game G(p0, p1, q
1
2). It can
be viewed as a Cournot game in which firm 2 has built a “capacity” of q12 prior to the
game. We show that if the capacity q12 is too small, the game yields the standard Cournot
outcome and if it is too large, part of the capacity remains unutilized (thus for any p1 > 0,
building a very large capacity cannot be optimal for firm 2). Intermediate capacities have
a commitment value and effectively establishes firm 2 as the Stackelberg leader in the final
good market α.
Next we move back to stage II(1). Here p0, p1 are given and firm 2 has to choose its
capacity q12. We show that firm 2’s optimal choice is either
(i) to order nothing from firm 1 (i.e. q12 = 0) and instead order exclusively from firm 0 to
obtain the Cournot profit with cost p0
or
(ii) to order nothing from firm 0 and order exclusively the Stackelberg leader output from
firm 1 (i.e. build a capacity q12 exactly equal this output).
Whether firm 2 prefers to be a Stackelberg leader or a Cournot duopolist depends on the
relative values of p0 and p1. For any p0, recall (from section 4.1) that we have identified a
function τ(p0) that represents the leadership premium: if p1 < τ(p0), firm 2 prefers to be the
Stackelberg leader and if p1 > τ(p0), it prefers to be a Cournot duopolist.
Finally we arrive at stage I where firms 0 and 1 simultaneously set prices p0, p1 for the
intermediate good η (for Γ˜, where firm 0 is part of a competitive fringe, it has no strategic
role and p0 automatically equals c0). Any p0, p1 leads to the game G(p0, p1) whose SPNE
results in either the Cournot outcome or the Stackelberg outcome. In the Cournot outcome,
2 orders the good η exclusively from firm 0 and then the Cournot game ensues between firms
1 and 2 in the final good market α. In the Stackelberg outcome, 2 orders η exclusively from
firm 1 and then the Stackelberg game ensues between firms 1 and 2 in the market α with 2
as the leader and 1 the follower. Firm 1’s profit in the the market α is clearly lower when
it is the Stackelberg follower rather than a Cournot duopolist. Therefore 1 prefers to be the
follower only if it can obtain a sufficiently high supplier price of η from firm 2 so that it can
recover its losses in the market α. However, if firm 0 is not too inefficient compared to 1, it
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can undercut a high price of η set by 1. Recall (also from section 4.1) that we have identified
a threshold θ̂ for regime change such that when 0’s unit cost c0 is below θ̂, any SPNE will
entail firm 2 ordering η from firm 0, followed by the Cournot outcome in the market α. If
c0 > θ̂, firm 2 orders η exclusively from firm 1, followed by the Stackelberg outcome in the
market α with 2 as the leader and 1 the follower.
5 The formal proof of the main results
5.1 Preliminary observations
Let x1, x2 be the quantities of α produced by firms 1, 2 and P (.) be the price of α. Recall
that the inverse market demand for good α is
P (x1 + x2) = a− x1 − x2 if x1 + x2 < a and P (x1 + x2) = 0 otherwise (5)
Also recall that any terminal node of Γ or Γ˜ is specified by p ≡ (p0, p1), q ≡ {qij}i=0,1j=1,2 and
x ≡ (x1, x2) (p0 ≡ c0 for Γ˜). For i = 0, 1, 2, the payoff pii(p, q) of firm i is given by
pi0(p, q) = p0(q
0
1 + q
0
2)− c0(q01 + q02) (6)
pi1(p, q, x) = P (x1 + x2)x1 + p1q
1
2 − (p0q01 + c1q11) and (7)
pi2(p, q, x) = P (x1 + x2)x2 − (p0q02 + p1q12) (8)
Fix the demand at (5). Let C(p0) be the Cournot duopoly game between firms 1 and 2 where
1 has (constant unit) cost c1 and 2 has cost p0. We know that C(p0) has a unique NE. For
i = 1, 2, denote by φi(p0) the NE profit of firm i in C(p0).
Lemma 2 In any SPNE of Γ or Γ˜, (i) firm 0 obtains at least zero and (ii) firm 1 obtains at
least φ1(c0).
Proof (i) Follows by noting that firm 0 can always ensure zero payoff by setting a sufficiently
high input price (e.g., p0 > a) so that no firm places an order of η with it.
(ii) Observe that firm 1 always has the option of setting a sufficiently high input price
(e.g., p1 > a) to ensure that 2 does not order η from 1. For any such p1, 2 orders η only
from 0 and the game C(p0) is played in the market α. If x2 = 0 (i.e. 2 supplies nothing in
the market α) in the NE of C(p0), then firm 1 obtains the monopoly profit which is higher
than φ1(c0). If x2 > 0, we must have p0 ≥ c0 (otherwise firm 0 will obtain a negative payoff,
contradicting (i)) and 1 obtains φ1(p0) ≥ φ1(c0). 
We apply backward induction to determine SPNE of Γ and Γ˜. We therefore begin from
stage II(2) of these games.
5.2 Stage II(2) of Γ and Γ˜
In light of Lemma 1, let p0 ≥ c1. In stage II(2), p0, p1, q12 are given (p0 ≡ c0 for Γ˜) and firms
1, 2 play the simultaneous-move game G(p0, p1, q
1
2). In this game, firm 1 chooses (q
0
1, q
1
1, x1)
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subject to (a) q01 + q
1
1 ≥ q12 and (b) x1 ≤ q01 + q11 − q12. Firm 2 chooses (q02, x2) subject to
x2 ≤ q02 +q12. Since q01 = 0 (Lemma 1), firm 1 produces η entirely by itself at unit cost c1 > 0.
Since p0 ≥ c1 > 0, firm 2’s unit cost of ordering η from firm 0 is positive. Then, optimality
requires that
(i) For firm 1, q11 = x1 +q
1
2 (every unit of η produced by firm 1 is utilized completely either
to supply α or to fulfill the order of η for firm 2).
(ii) For firm 2, q02 = max{x2 − q12, 0}. If x2 ≤ q12 then q02 = 0 (if firm 2’s supply of α does
not exceed the amount q12 of η that it has ordered from 1, then it does not order η from
0) and if x2 > q
1
2 then q
0
2 = x2 − q12 (if firm 2’s supply of α exceeds q12, its order of η
from firm 0 equals exactly the additional amount it needs to meet its supply).
By (i) and (ii) above, G(p0, p1, q
1
2) reduces to the game where firms 1 and 2 simultaneously
choose x1, x2 ≥ 0. By (i) and (7), the payoff of firm 1 is
pi1(x1, x2) = P (x1 + x2)x1 − c1x1 + (p1 − c1)q12 (9)
By (ii) and (8), the payoff of firm 2 is
pi2(x1, x2) =
{
P (x1 + x2)x2 − p1q12 if x2 ≤ q12
P (x1 + x2)x2 − p0x2 − (p1 − p0)q12 if x2 > q12 (10)
Observe that the last term in the payoff of both (9) and (10) is a lump-sum upfront trans-
fer between firms 1 and 2 obtained before the game G(p0, p1, q
1
2). Ignoring these transfers,
G(p0, p1, q
1
2) can be viewed as a Cournot duopoly game in market the α where firm 1 has
unit cost c1 and firm 2 has built a commonly known “capacity” q
1
2 prior to the game (paying
the sunk cost p1q
1
2), so that 2’s unit cost is 0 if it chooses to supply x2 ≤ q12, while it is p0 if
x2 > q
1
2.
Fix the inverse demand at (5) and firm 1’s constant unit cost at c1. For c2 ∈ {p0, 0}, let
C(c2) be the Cournot duopoly game where firm 2 has constant unit cost c2. In C(c2), firm
i’s unique best response to its rival firm j’s quantity xj is
bci(xj) =
{
(a− ci − xj)/2 if xj ≤ a− ci
0 if xj > a− ci
For c2 ∈ {p0, 0}, let (k1(c2), k2(c2)) be the quantities of firms 1 and 2 in the unique NE of
C(c2). We know that
(k1(p0), k2(p0)) =
{
((a− 2c1 + p0)/3, (a+ c1 − 2p0)/3) if c1 ≤ p0 < (a+ c1)/2
((a− c1)/2, 0) if p0 ≥ (a+ c1)/2 (11)
(k1(0), k2(0)) =
{
((a− 2c1)/3, (a+ c1)/3) if c1 < a/2
(0, a/2) if c1 ≥ a/2 (12)
For i = 1, 2, denote by φi(c2) the NE profit of firm i in C(c2).
Lemma 3 For G(p0, p1, q
1
2)
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(i) The unique best response of firm 1 to x2 ≥ 0 is bc1(x2). The unique best response of
firm 2 to x1 ≥ 0 is (a) bp0(x1) if q12 < bp0(x1), (b) b0(x1) if q12 > b0(x1) and (c) q12 if
bp0(x1) ≤ q12 ≤ b0(x1).
(ii) If (x1, x2) is an NE, then (a) x1 = b
c1(x2), (b) x2 = b
p0(x1) if x2 > q
1
2, (c) x2 = b
0(x1)
if x2 < q
1
2 and (d) b
p0(x1) ≤ x2 ≤ b0(x1) if x2 = q12.
(iii) (a) If q12 ≤ k2(p0), there is no NE where x2 < q12 and (b) if q12 ≥ k2(0), there is no NE
where x2 > q
1
2.
Proof (i) The first part is direct by (9). To determine firm 2’s best response(s), denote
m(x1) := min{b0(x1), q12} and M(x1) := max{bp0(x1), q12} (13)
By (10), for x1 ≥ 0, the unique optimal strategy of firm 2 over x2 ∈ [0, q12] is m(x1) while
over x2 ∈ [q12,∞), it is M(x1). As bp0(x1) ≤ b0(x1) and x2 = q12 is feasible for both [0, q12] and
[q12,∞), (a)-(c) follow by (13).
(ii) Follows by (i).
(iii)(a) If (x1, x2) is an NE where x2 < q
1
2, then by (ii)(a) and (c), x1 = b
c1(x2) and
x2 = b
0(x1). The unique solution to this system has x1 = k1(0) and x2 = k2(0) > k2(p0) ≥ q12,
contradicting x2 < q
1
2.
(iii)(b) If (x1, x2) is an NE where x2 > q
1
2, then by (ii)(a) and (b), x1 = b
c1(x2) and
x2 = b
p0(x1). The unique solution to this system is x1 = k1(p0) and x2 = k2(p0) < k2(0) ≤ q12,
contradicting x2 > q
1
2. 
Lemma SII(2) (Stage II(2)) (i) G(p0, p1, q
1
2) has a unique NE where q
0
1 = 0, q
1
1 = x1 + q
1
2
and which is given as follows:
(a) (Small capacity) If q12 < k2(p0), then x1 = k1(p0), x2 = k2(p0) and q
0
2 = k2(p0)− q12;
(b) (Intermediate capacity) If k2(p0) ≤ q12 ≤ k2(0), then x1 = bc1(q12), x2 = q12 and q02 = 0;
(c) (Large capacity) If q12 > k2(0), then x1 = k1(0), x2 = k2(0) and q
0
2 = 0.
(ii) Suppose p0 ≥ (a + c1)/2. Then the NE of G(p0, p1, q12) is invariant of p0. Hence w.l.o.g.
we may restrict p0 ≤ (a+ c1)/2.
Proof (i)(a) Let 0 ≤ q12 < k2(p0). First we show that (k1(p0), k2(p0)) is an NE. Clearly k1(p0)
is the unique best response of firm 1 to k2(p0). Since b
p0 (k1(p0)) = k2(p0) > q
1
2, k2(p0) is the
unique best response of firm 2 to k1(p0).
To prove the uniqueness, note by Lemma 3 (iii)(a) that if (x1, x2) is an NE, we must have
x2 ≥ q12.
If (x1, q
1
2) is an NE, then by Lemma 3(ii)(a) and (d), x1 = b
c1(q12) and q
1
2 ≥ bp0(x1) =
bp0 (bc1(q12)) . Since x2 S k2(p0)⇔ x2 S bp0 (bc1(x2)) , we have q12 ≥ k2(p0), a contradiction.
Hence if (x1, x2) is an NE, then x2 > q
1
2 and by 3 (ii)(a)-(b), x1 = b
c1(x2) and x2 = b
p0(x1).
The unique solution of this system has x1 = k1(p0) and x2 = k2(p0), completing the proof.
(i)(b) Let k2(p0) ≤ q12 ≤ k2(0). Since for c2 ∈ {0, p0}, x2 S k2(c2) ⇔ x2 S bc2 (bc1(x2)) ,
we have bp0 (bc1(q12)) ≤ q12 ≤ b0 (bc1(q12)) and by 3(i) it follows that (bc1(q12), q12) is an NE.
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The uniqueness follows from 3(ii)(a)-(d) by noting that for this case there is no NE where
x2 6= q12.
(i)(c) Let q12 > k2(0). First we show that (k1(0), k2(0)) is an NE. Clearly k1(0) is the
unique best response of firm 1 to k2(0). Since b
0 (k1(0)) = k2(0) < q
1
2, by (i)(b), k2(0) is the
unique best response of firm 2 to k1(0).
To prove the uniqueness, note by 3(iii)(b) that if (x1, x2) is an NE, we must have x2 ≤ q12.
If (x1, q
1
2) is an NE, then by 3(ii)(a) and (d), x1 = b
c1(q12) and q
1
2 ≤ b0(x1) = b0 (bc1(q12)) .
Since x2 S k2(0)⇔ x2 S b0 (bc1(x2)) , we have q12 ≤ k2(0), a contradiction.
Hence if (x1, x2) is an NE, then x2 < q
1
2 and by 3(ii)(a) and (c), x1 = b
c1(x2) and
x2 = b
0(x1). The unique solution of this system has x1 = k1(0) and x1 = k2(0), completing
the proof.
(ii) If p0 ≥ (a + c1)/2 > c1, then q01 = 0 and in the NE of G(p0, p1, q12), q02 > 0 only if
q12 ∈ [0, k2(p0)) [part(i)]. Since k2(p0) = 0 for p0 ≥ (a + c1)/2 [by (11)], we have q01 + q02 = 0
for p0 ≥ (a+ c1)/2, yielding zero payoff for firm 0. This proves (ii). 
Lemma SII(2) shows that for firm 2, building a capacity that is too large (q12 > k2(0))
leads to some part of it being unutilized while a capacity that is too small (q12 < k2(p0))
provides no strategic advantage. Intermediate capacities (k2(p0) ≤ q12 ≤ k2(0)) are fully
utilized, and moreover firm 2 does not make any additional order of η from firm 0 (i.e.
firm 2 orders η exclusively from firm 1). Such intermediate capacities constitute a credible
commitment that establishes firm 2 as the Stackelberg leader in the NE of G(p0, p1, q
1
2).
5.3 Stage II(1) of Γ and Γ˜: The leadership premium
Any node in stage II(1) corresponds to a specific price pair (p0, p1) ≡ p (for Γ˜, p0 ≡ c0).
This is stage 1 of the game G(p0, p1) where firm 2 chooses q
1
2 ≥ 0. Any such q12 results in the
game G(p0, p1, q
1
2), whose unique NE is characterized in Lemma SII(2). By (10) and Lemma
SII(2), the payoff of firm 2 at the unique NE of G(p0, p1, q
1
2) is
15
pip2(q
1
2) =

φ2(p0) + (p0 − p1)q12 if q12 < k2(p0)
P (bc1(q12) + q
1
2) q
1
2 − p1q12 if k2(p0) ≤ q12 ≤ k2(0)
φ2(0)− p1q12 if q12 > k2(0)
(14)
Therefore in stage II(1), firm 2 solves the single-person decision problem of choosing q12 ≥ 0
to maximize pip2(q
1
2).
Fix the inverse demand at (5) and the constant unit cost of firm 1 at c1. Let S(p1) be the
Stackelberg duopoly with firm 2 as the leader and firm 1 the follower, where 2 has constant
unit cost p1. Note from (14) that for q
1
2 ∈ [k2(p0), k2(0)], firm 2 solves the constrained problem
of the Stackelberg leader in S(p1), where 2 is restricted to choose its output in the interval
[k2(p0), k2(0)]. It will be useful to define
s2(p1) := min{s˜2(p1), k2(0)} and s1(p1) := bc1 (s2(p1)) = max{s˜1(p1), k1(0)} (15)
Recall that (k1(p0), k2(p0)) (given in (11)) is the unique NE of C(p0).
15Fix the inverse demand at (5) and firm 1’s constant unit cost at c1. Recall that for c2 ∈ {p0, 0}, the
Cournot duopoly game where firm 2 has constant unit cost c2 is denoted by C(c2). For i = 1, 2, the NE profit
of firm i in C(c2) is denoted by φi(c2).
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Definition In the game G(p0, p1), the Cournot outcome is played if (x1, x2) = (k1(p0), k2(p0))
and the Stackelberg outcome is played if (x1, x2) = (s1(p1), s2(p1)).
Lemma 4 In any SPNE of Γ or Γ˜:
(i) If 0 < p1 ≤ p0, then firm 2 chooses q12 = s2(p1).
(ii) p1 > c1.
(iii) If p1 ≥ (a+ c1)/2, then q12 = 0.
Proof (i) Observe by (14) if p1 > 0, then it is not optimal for firm 2 to choose q
1
2 > k2(0), so
let q12 ≤ k2(0). By lemmas 1 and SII(2), p0 ∈ [c1, (a+ c1)/2]. If p0 = (a+ c1)/2, then by (11),
k2(p0) = 0 and the result is immediate. So let p0 < (a + c1)/2. Then s2(p1) > k2(p0) > 0
for p1 ≤ p0. As the unconstrained maximum of pip2(q12) over q12 ∈ [k2(p0), k2(0)] is attained at
q12 = s˜2(p1), using (15), its constrained maximizer is q
1
2 = s2(p1) and pi
p
2(s2(p1)) > pi
p
2(k2(p0)).
As for q12 ≤ k2(p0), pip2(q12) is either increasing (if p1 < p0) or constant (if p1 = p0), it follows
that the unique global optimal choice for firm 2 in stage II(1) is q12 = s2(p1).
(ii) If p1 ≤ c1, then firm 1 does not obtain any positive profit as a supplier of η. We will
show that if p1 ≤ c1, firm 1’s profit in the final good market α is less than φ1(c0). Then the
result will follow from Lemma 2.
By Lemma 1, p0 ≥ c1. If 0 < p1 ≤ c1 ≤ p0, then by (i), it is optimal for firm 2 to choose
q12 = s2(p1) = min{s˜2(p1), k2(0)}. If p1 = 0, then by (14), it is optimal to choose either
q12 = s2(p1) or any q
1
2 ≥ k2(0).
If q12 = s2(p1) ∈ (k2(p0), k2(0)], firm 2 will supply x2 = s2(p1) in the market α (Lemma
SII(2)) and firm 1’s profit there would be f(p1) < φ1(p1) < φ1(p0) ≤ φ1(c0). If q12 ≥ k2(0),
then 2 will supply x2 = k2(0) (Lemma SII(2)) and firm 1’s profit in the market α would be
φ1(0) < φ1(c0).
(iii) By (14), it is not optimal for firm 2 to choose q12 > k2(0) for any positive p1, so let
q12 ≤ k2(0). Note that (a+c1)/2 is the monopoly price under unit cost c1. For p1 ≥ (a+c1)/2,
the SPNE of S(p1) is (s˜1(p1), s˜2(p1)) = ((a− c1)/2, 0) (i.e. firm 2 produces zero output and
firm 1 produces the monopoly output (a− c1)/2). Using this in (14), for q12 ∈ [k2(p0), k2(0)],
the unconstrained maximizer of pip2(q
1
2) is q
1
2 = 0 ≤ k2(p0). Thus, pip2(q12) is decreasing for
q12 ∈ [k2(p0), k2(0)], so consider q12 ≤ k2(p0). If p0 ≥ (a + c1)/2, then by (11), k2(p0) = 0
and the optimal choice for firm 2 is q12 = 0. If p0 < (a + c1)/2 ≤ p1, then by (14), pip2(q12) is
decreasing for q12 ∈ [0, k2(p0)], so the optimal choice is again q12 = 0. 
In the light of Lemma 4(ii), consider p1 > c1 > 0. Then the SPNE of S(p1) is
(s˜1(p1), s˜2(p1)) =
{
((a− 3c1 + 2p1)/4, (a+ c1)/2− p1) if c1 < p1 < (a+ c1)/2
((a− c1)/2, 0) if p1 ≥ (a+ c1)/2 (16)
Using (15) and (16), by standard computations it follows that
(s1(p1), s2(p1)) =
{
(k1(0), k2(0)) if c1 < a/2 and p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6
(s˜1(p1), s˜2(p1)) otherwise
(17)
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At the SPNE of S(p1), let `(p1) be the profit of the leader (firm 2) and f(p1) the profit of
the follower (firm 1). If firm 2 chooses q12 = s2(p1), then it obtains the Stackelberg leader
(possibly constrained) profit. By (17), this profit is
L(p1) :=
{
φ2(0)− p1k2(0) if c1 < a/2 and p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6
`(p1) otherwise
(18)
Firm 1’s payoff has two components: (i) the Stackelberg follower’s profit and (ii) its supplier
revenue (p1 − c1)s2(p1). Using (17), firm 1’s payoff is
F (p1) :=
{
φ1(0) + (p1 − c1)k2(0) if c1 < a/2 and p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6
f(p1) + (p1 − c1)s2(p1) otherwise (19)
It follows by Lemma 4 that if p1 ≤ p0, then the Stackelberg outcome is played in the
unique SPNE of G(p0, p1). Next consider p1 > p0 ≥ c1 > 0. Then it follows by (14) that (i)
it is not optimal for 2 to choose q12 > k2(0) and (ii) over q
1
2 ≤ k2(p0), it is optimal to choose
q12 = 0. If q
1
2 = 0, then the Cournot duopoly game C(p0) is played in the market α where
firm 1 obtains φ1(p0) and firm 2 obtains φ2(p0). Firm 0 supplies q
0
2 = k2(p0) units of η to
firm 2 at price p0, so it obtains
ψ(p0) = (p0 − c0)k2(p0) (20)
If 2 chooses q12 ∈ [k2(p0), k2(0)] by paying p1 > p0 for the capacity q12, it can acquire the
Stackelberg leadership (possibly constrained) position in the market α.
Firm 2 determines optimal q12 by comparing its Stackelberg leader profit with the Cournot
profit φ2(p0). Lemma SII(1) shows that there is a function τ(p0) ∈ [p0, (a+c1)/2] (representing
the leadership premium) such that 2 prefers to be the Stackelberg leader as long as p1 < τ(p0).
Define τ1, τ2 : [c1, (a+ c1)/2]→ R+ as
τ1(p0) := 4p0(a+ c1 − p0)/3(a+ c1) and τ2(p0) := (3− 2
√
2)(a+ c1)/6 + 2
√
2p0/3 (21)
Denote
θ(c1) := (
√
2− 1)(a+ c1)/2
√
2 (22)
Define the function τ(p0) as
τ(p0) :=
{
τ1(p0) if p0 < θ(c1)
τ2(p0) if p0 ≥ θ(c1) (23)
Standard computations show that (i) τ(p0) is continuous and increasing and (ii) τ(p0) > p0
for p0 ∈ [c1, (a+ c1)/2) and τ((a+ c1)/2) = (a+ c1)/2.
Lemma SII(1) (Stage II(1)) (Leadership premium) ∃ a function τ : [c1, (a+ c1)/2]→
R+ (given in (23)), such that for p1 ≥ c1 and p0 ∈ [c1, (a+ c1)/2]:
(i) In any SPNE of G(p0, p1), q
0
2q
1
2 = 0 (firm 2 orders η either exclusively from firm 0 or
exclusively from firm 1).
(ii) If p1 < τ(p0), the Stackelberg outcome is played in the unique SPNE of G(p0, p1) where
x2 = q
1
2 = s2(p1), x1 = q
1
1 − q12 = s1(p1) and q01 = q02 = 0. Firm 0 obtains zero payoff,
firm 1 obtains F (p1) and firm 2 obtains L(p1).
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(iii) If p1 > τ(p0), the Cournot outcome is played in the unique SPNE of G(p0, p1) where
x2 = q
0
2 = k2(p0), x1 = q
1
1 = k1(p0) and q
0
1 = q
1
2 = 0. Firm 0 obtains ψ(p0), firm 1
obtains φ1(p0) and firm 2 obtains φ2(p0).
(iv) If p1 = τ(p0), G(p0, p1) has two SPNE: the Stackelberg outcome is played in one and
the Cournot outcome is played in the other.
Proof First we prove (ii)-(iv). Part (i) follow immediately from (ii)-(iv). Denote A1(p) :=
[0, k2(p0)], A2(p) := [k2(p0), k2(0)] and A(p) = A1(p) ∪ A2(p). It follows from (14) that for
p1 ≥ c1 > 0, it is not optimal for firm 2 to choose q12 > k2(0). Therefore any optimal q12
belongs to the set A(p). Let
A∗t (p) := arg max
q12∈At(p)
pip2(q
1
2) for t = 1, 2 and A
∗(p) := arg max
q12∈A(p)
pip2(q
1
2)
Then A∗(p) ⊆ A∗1(p)∪A∗2(p). We prove the result by showing that A∗(p) = {0} if p1 < τ(p0),
A∗(p) = {s2(p1)} if p1 > τ(p0) and A∗(p) = {0, s2(p1)} if p1 = τ(p0).
By Lemma 4, A∗(p) = {s2(p1)} if p1 ≤ p0. So consider p1 > p0. Then it follows from (14)
that A∗1(p) = {0}. Denote
g(p0) := (2/3)p0 + (1/3)(a+ c1)/2
If p0 = (a + c1)/2, then k2(p0) = 0 and A(p) = A2(p), so that A
∗(p) = A∗2(p) = {s2(p1)}.
Since g(p0) = τ(p0) = (a+ c1)/2 for p0 = (a+ c1)/2, the proof for this case is complete.
Now suppose p1 > p0 and p0 < (a + c1)/2, so that g(p0) > p0. Then there are two
possibilities.
If p1 ≥ g(p0), we have s2(p1) ≤ k2(p0). Hence A∗2(p) = {k2(p0)}. Thus, k2(p0) ∈ A∗2(p) ∩
A1(p) but k2(p0) /∈ A∗1(p) = {0}. Therefore for this case, A∗(p) = A∗1(p) = {0}.
If p1 ∈ (p0, g(p0)), then A∗1 = {0} and A∗2(p) = {s2(p1)}. Hence A∗(p) ⊆ {0, s2(p1)}. Note
that pip2(0) = φ2(p0) = (a + c1 − 2p0)2/9 and pip2(s2(p1)) = L(p1) (given in (18)). Using (16)
and (17) in (18), we have
L(p1) =
{ ̂`(p1) = (a+ c1)2/9− p1(a+ c1)/3 if c1 < a/2 and p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6,
`(p1) = (a+ c1 − 2p1)2/8 otherwise. (24)
Comparing φ2(p0) = (a + c1 − 2p0)2/9 with ̂`(p1) and `(p1) we have the following where τ1,
τ2 are given in (21).
̂`(p1) T φ2(p0)⇔ p1 S τ1(p0) and `(p1) T φ2(p0)⇔ p1 S τ2(p0) (25)
There are following possible cases, where θ(c1) is given by (22).
Case 1(a) If c1 < a/2 and p0 ≥ (a + c1)/6 > θ(c1), then by (23), τ(p0) = τ2(p0). Since
p1 > p0, under this case we have p1 > (a+ c1)/6.
Case 1(b) If c1 ≥ a/2, then by (22), θ(c1) < c1 ≤ p0 and again τ(p0) = τ2(p0).
Observe by (24) that if either 1(a) or 1(b) holds, then L(p1) = `(p1). Hence by (25),
L(p1) T φ2(p0)⇔ p1 S τ2(p0) = τ(p0) proving the result for Case 1.
Case 2 c1 < a/2 and p0 < (a+ c1)/6:
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Case 2(a) If p0 ≤ θ(c1), then τ(p0) = τ1(p0) ≤ (a+ c1)/6 and τ2(p0) ≤ (a+ c1)/6 [by (23)].
(i) If p1 ∈ (p0, (a+ c1)/6], then by (24), L(p1) = ̂`(p1). Hence by (25), L(p1) T φ2(p0)⇔
p1 S τ1(p0) = τ(p0).
(ii) If p1 ∈ ((a+ c1)/6, g(p0)], then by (24), L(p1) = `(p1). Hence by (25), L(p1) < φ2(p0)
for p1 > (a+ c1)/6 ≥ τ2(p0).
The result for Case 2(a) follows by (i) and (ii) above.
Case 2(b) If p0 ∈ (θ(c1), (a+c1)/6), then τ(p0) = τ2(p0) > (a+c1)/6 and τ1(p0) > (a+c1)/6
[by (23)].
(i) If p1 ∈ (p0, (a+ c1)/6], then by (24), L(p1) = ̂`(p1). Hence by (25), L(p1) > φ2(p0) for
p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6 < τ1(p0).
(ii) If p1 ∈ ((a + c1)/6, g(p0)), then by (24), L(p1) = `(p1). Hence by (25), L(p1) T
φ2(p0)⇔ p1 S τ2(p0) = τ(p0).
The result for Case 2(b) follows by (i) and (ii) above. 
5.4 Stage I of Γ and Γ˜
Now we go to the first stage of Γ and Γ˜ where firms 0 and 1 simultaneously announce prices
p0, p1 (p0 ≡ c0 for Γ˜) that result in the game G(p0, p1), whose SPNE are characterized in
Lemma S(II)(1). Lemma 5 summarizes some properties of the functions ψ(p0) (firm 0’s payoff
under the Cournot outcome, given by (20)) and F (p1) (firm 1’s payoff under the Stackelberg
outcome, given by (19)).
Define
θ0(c1, c0) := c0/2 + (a+ c1)/4 ∈ (c0, (a+ c1)/2) (26)
θ̂1(c1) :=
[
a+ 4c1 −
√
a2 − 7ac1 + c21
]
/5 and θ̂2(c1) := a/14 + 13c1/14 (27)
Observe that θ̂2(c1) ∈ (c1, θ0(c1, c0)) for c1 < a and
θ̂2(c1) T θ(c1)⇔ c1 T ρa where ρ ≡ 23/[121 + 84
√
2] ∈ (0, 1/2) (28)
Also note that for c1 < ρa, θ̂1(c1) is real and c1 < θ̂1(c1) < θ(c1) < θ0(c1, c0). Define
θ̂(c1) :=
{
θ̂1(c1) if c1 < ρa
θ̂2(c1) if c1 ≥ ρa
(29)
Observe that θ̂(c1) is continuous and
θ̂(c1) S θ(c1)⇔ c1 S ρa (30)
Lemma 5 There are functions θ0(c0, c1) ∈ (c0, (a + c1)/2) (given in (26)) and θ̂(c1) ∈
(c1, θ0(c0, c1)) (given in (29)) such that
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(i) ψ(p0) is increasing for p0 ∈ [c1, θ0), decreasing for p0 ∈ (θ0, (a + c1)/2] and its unique
maximum is attained at p0 = θ0.
(ii) ψ(c0) = ψ((a+c1)/2) = 0, ψ(p0) < 0 if p0 ∈ [c1, c0) and ψ(p0) > 0 if p0 ∈ (c0, (a+c1)/2).
(iii) F (θ0) > φ1(θ0).
(iv) F (p1) is increasing for p1 ∈ [0, (a+ c1)/2].
(v) For p0 ∈ [c1, θ0], F (τ(p0)) T φ1(p0)⇔ p0 T θ̂.
Proof Parts (i)-(ii) follow from (20) by noting that k2(p0) = (a + c1 − 2p0)/3 for p0 ∈
[c1, (a+ c1)/2].
(iii) Noting that θ0 > (a + c1)/6, by (19), we have F (p1) = f(p1) + (p1 − c1)s1(p1). As
c1 < c0 < θ0 < (a+c1)/2, by (16), F (θ0) = (3a+2c0−5c1)2/64+(a+2c0−3c1)(a+c1−2c0)/16.
As φ1(θ0) = (5a + 2c0 − 7c1)2/144, we have F (θ0) − φ1(θ0) = (17a + 62c0 − 79c1)(a + c1 −
2c0)/576 > 0 since a > c0 > c1. This proves (iii).
(iv) Follows by standard computations by using (16) and (19).
(v) First let p0 ≥ θ(c1). Then by (23), τ(p0) = τ2(p0) ≥ (a + c1)/6. Hence by (16) and
(19), F (τ(p0)) = (a− 3c1 + 2τ(p0))2/16 + (τ(p0)− c1)[(a+ c1)/2− τ(p0)]. Comparing it with
φ1(p0) = (a− 2c1 + p0)2/9, we have the following where θ̂2(c1) is given by (27).
For p0 ≥ θ(c1), φ1(p0) T F (τ(p0))⇔ p0 S θ̂2(c1) (31)
Next observe that for p0 < θ(c1),
θ(c1) T c1 ⇔ c1 S ρa where ρ ≡ 1/(3 + 2
√
2) ∈ (0, 1/2) and ρ > ρ (32)
Case 1 c1 ≥ ρa: Then by (32), [c1, (a + c1)/2) ⊆ [θ(c1), (a + c1)/2). As ρ < ρ, for this case
θ̂(c1) = θ̂2(c1) [by (29)] and the result follows by (31).
Case 2 c1 < ρa: Then by (32), [c1, (a+ c1)/2) = [c1, θ(c1)) ∪ [θ(c1), (a+ c1)/2).
If p0 ∈ [c1, θ(c1)], then by (23), τ(p0) = τ1(p0) < (a + c1)/6. Since c1 < ρa < a/2,
by (12) and (19), F (τ(p0)) = (a − 2c1)2/9 + (τ(p0) − c1)(a + c1)/3. Comparing it with
φ1(p0) = (a− 2c1 + p0)2/9, we have
φ1(p0) T F (τ(p0))⇔ w(p0) T 0 where w(p0) := 5p20 − 2(a+ 4c1)p0 + 3c1(a+ c1) (33)
Noting that (i) w(p0) is decreasing for p0 ∈ [c1, θ(c1)], (ii) w(c1) > 0 and (iii) w(θ(c1)) T
0⇔ c1 T ρa, we have the following two subcases.
Subcase 2(a) c1 ∈ [ρa, ρa): Then for all p0 ∈ [c1, θ(c1)), w(p0) > 0 and hence by (33),
φ1(p0) > F (τ(p0)). Since for this case θ̂(c1) = θ̂2(c1) ≥ θ(c1) [(27) and (30)], the result
follows by (31).
Subcase 2(b) c1 < ρa: Then θ̂2(c1) < θ¯(c1) [by (28)]. Hence by (31), φ1(p0) < F (τ(p0)) for
p0 ∈ [θ(c1), (a + c1)/2). For p0 ∈ [c1, θ(c1)), w(c1) > 0 > w(θ(c1)) and ∃ θ̂1(c1) ∈ (c1, θ(c1))
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[given by (27)] such that φ1(p0) T F (τ(p0)) ⇔ p0 S θ̂1(c1). Noting that θ̂(c1) = θ̂1(c1) for
this case [by (29)], the proof is complete. 
Part (v) of Lemma 4 asserts that firm 1 prefers the Stackelberg outcome over the Cournot
outcome for relatively large values of p0. To see the intuition for this, observe that both φ1(p0)
and F (τ(p0)) are increasing in p0. While p0 has a direct effect on φ1(p0), its effect on F (τ(p0))
takes place through the function τ(p0). The latter causes a stronger effect since τ(p0) (the
leadership premium) itself increases with p0. As firm 2 is willing pay a higher premium for
larger values of p0, it leads to higher supplier revenue for firm 1. This in turn provides a
better compensation to firm 1 for its follower position in the ensuing Stackelberg game. This
is the reason why the Stackelberg outcome is preferred by firm 1 for relatively large values
of p0.
Lemma SI (Stage I)
(i) In any SPNE of Γ: (a) p1 = τ(p0) and (b) p0 ∈ [c1, θ0].
(ii) In any SPNE of Γ˜, p1 ≥ τ(c0).
(iii) In any SPNE of Γ:
(a) the Cournot outcome is played if and only if p1 = τ(p0), p0 ∈ [c0, θ0] and p0 ≤ θ̂.
(b) the Stackelberg outcome is played if and only if p1 = τ(p0), p0 ∈ [c1, c0] and p0 ≥ θ̂.
(iv) In any SPNE of Γ˜:
(a) the Cournot outcome is played if and only if p1 ≥ τ(c0) and c0 ≤ θ̂.
(b) the Stackelberg outcome is played if and only if p1 = τ(c0) and c0 ≥ θ̂.
Proof (i)(a) In any SPNE of Γ, p0 ≥ c1 (Lemma 1) and p1 > c1 (Lemma 4). Recall that
(a + c1)/2 is the monopoly price under unit cost c1. If p0 ≥ (a + c1)/2 in an SPNE of Γ,
then we must have p1 ≥ (a + c1)/2 as well, so that firm 1 obtains the monopoly profit and
firm 2 does not order any input from either 0 or 1 resulting in zero profit for firm 0. But
then 0 can deviate to p′0 < (a+ c1)/2 = p1 to ensure positive order of η from firm 2 and thus
obtain positive profit. Therefore in any SPNE of Γ, we must have p0 < (a + c1)/2. Thus,
p0 ∈ [c1, (a+ c1)/2) and the function τ(p0) is well defined.
If p1 < τ(p0), then firm 1 obtains F (p1). As F is monotonic (Lemma 5), firm 1 can
deviate to p′1 ∈ (p1, τ(p0)) to obtain F (p′1) > F (p1). So we must have p1 ≥ τ(p0).
If p1 > τ(p0), firm 0 obtains ψ(p0). If p
′
0 is marginally higher or lower than p0, we will have
p1 > τ(p
′
0) and 0 would obtain ψ(p
′
0) by deviating to p
′
0. As ψ is increasing for p0 ∈ [c1, θ0)
and decreasing for p0 ∈ [θ0, (a+ c1)/2) (Lemma 5), there are gainful deviations for firm 0 if
p0 6= θ0.
Now let p0 = θ0 and p1 > τ(θ0). Then firm 1 obtains φ1(θ0). By deviating to p
′
1 = θ0 <
τ(θ0), firm 1 would obtain F (θ0) > φ1(θ0) (Lemma 5). This completes the proof of (i)(a).
(i)(b) Since p0 ∈ [c1, (a + c1)/2), if the claim is false, then p0 ∈ (θ0, (a + c1)/2). Since
p1 = τ(p0) [by (i)(b)], firm 0 obtains either zero payoff (the Cournot outcome) or ψ(p0) (the
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Stackelberg outcome). Let 0 deviate to p′0 = θ0 < p0 so that τ(θ0) < τ(p0) = p1. Then 0
would obtain ψ(θ0) which is positive and more than ψ(p0) (Lemma 5), proving the result.
(ii) Since c0 ∈ (c1, (a + c1)/2), τ(c0) is well defined and (ii) follows from the second
paragraph of the proof of (i)(a) by taking p0 ≡ c0.
For the proofs of (iii) and (iv), note that θ̂ < θ0 < (a+ c1)/2.
(iii)(a) The “if” part: Let p1 = τ(p0), p0 ∈ [c0, θ0] and p0 ≤ θ̂. Then there is an SPNE
of G(p0, p1) where the Cournot outcome is played (Lemma SII(1)(iv)). In this SPNE, firm 0
obtains ψ(p0) ≥ 0 (since p0 ≥ c0) and firm 1 obtains φ1(p0). We prove the result by showing
that neither 0 nor 1 has a gainful unilateral deviation.
By deviating to p′0 ≥ (a + c1)/2, firm 0 would obtain zero, so such a deviation is not
gainful. Now let p′0 < (a+ c1)/2. If firm 0 deviates to p
′
0 < c0, it would obtain at most zero.
If it deviates to p′0 > p0, then τ(p
′
0) > τ(p0) = p1 and firm 0 would obtain 0 ≤ ψ(p0). If it
deviates to p′0 ∈ [c0, p0), then τ(p′0) < τ(p0) = p1 and it would obtain ψ(p′0). Since p′0 < p0
and p′0, p0 ∈ [c0, θ0] ⊂ [c1, θ0], by Lemma 5(i) it follows that ψ(p′0) < ψ(p0), so this deviation
is also not gainful.
Now consider firm 1. If it deviates to p′1 > p1 = τ(p0), it would still obtain φ1(p0). If it
deviates to p′1 < p1 = τ(p0), it would obtain F (p
′
1) < F (τ(p0)) (by the monotonicity of F ).
Since F (τ(p0)) ≤ φ1(p0) for p0 ≤ θ̂ (Lemma 5(v)), we have F (p′1) < φ1(p0), so this deviation
is not gainful. This completes the proof of the “if” part.
The “only if” part: By (i), p1 = τ(p0) and p0 ∈ [c1, θ0] in any SPNE. Under the Cournot
outcome, firm 0 obtains ψ(p0) and firm 1 obtains φ1(p0). If p0 < c0, then ψ(p0) < 0. As firm
0 can deviate to p′0 = (a + c1)/2 to obtain zero payoff, if the Cournot outcome is played in
an SPNE of Γ, we must have p0 ≥ c0. Since p0 ≤ θ0, we conclude that p0 ∈ [c0, θ0].
By deviating to p′1 > p1 = τ(p0), firm 1 obtains F (p
′
1) which can be made arbitrarily
close to F (τ(p0)) by choosing p
′
1 sufficiently close to p1. To ensure that firm 1’s deviation is
not gainful for any p′1 ∈ (0, p1), we need φ1(p0) ≥ F (τ(p0)), so by Lemma 5(v) we must have
p0 ≤ θ̂.
(iii)(b) The “if” part: Let p1 = τ(p0), p0 ∈ [c1, c0] and p0 ≥ θ̂. Then there is an SPNE of
G(p0, p1) where the Stackelberg outcome is played. In this SPNE, firm 0 obtains zero payoff
and firm 1 obtains F (p1) = F (τ(p0)). We prove the result by showing that neither 0 nor 1
has a gainful unilateral deviation.
By deviating to p′0 ≥ (a + c1)/2, firm 0 would obtain zero, so such a deviation is not
gainful. Consider p′0 < (a + c1)/2. If 0 deviates to p
′
0 > p0, then p1 = τ(p0) < τ(p
′
0) and it
would still obtain zero payoff. If it deviates to p′0 < p0 ≤ c0, then it would obtain at most
zero and such a deviation is also not gainful.
Now consider firm 1. If it deviates to p′1 > p1 = τ(p0), it would obtain φ1(p0). Since
p0 ≥ θ̂, by Lemma 5(v), φ1(p0) ≤ F (τ(p0)) = F (p1), so this deviation is not gainful. If firm
1 deviates to p′1 ∈ [0, c1), it would obtain less than φ1(c1) (see the proof of Lemma 4(ii))
which is at most φ1(p0) ≤ F (p1). Finally if it deviates to p′1 ∈ [c1, p1), it would obtain F (p′1)
and by the monotonicity of F , such a deviation is also not gainful.
The “only if” part: By (i), p1 = τ(p0) and p0 ∈ [c1, θ0] in any SPNE. Under the Stackel-
berg outcome, firm 0 obtains zero and firm 1 obtains F (p1) = F (τ(p0)). If p0 > c0, let firm 0
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deviate to p′0 ∈ (c0, p0). Then p1 = τ(p0) > τ(p′0) and firm 0 would obtain ψ(p′0) > 0, making
such a deviation gainful. Therefore we must have p0 ≤ c0. Since p0 ≥ c1, we conclude that
p0 ∈ [c1, c0].
If firm 1 deviates to p′1 > p1 = τ(p0), it would obtain φ1(p0). To ensure that this deviation
is not gainful, we need φ1(p0) ≤ F (τ(p0)), so by Lemma 5(v), we must have p0 ≥ θ̂.
(iv) Note that for the game Γ˜, p0 ≡ c0 and firm 0 does not play any strategic role there.
(iv)(a) The “if” part: Let p1 ≥ τ(c0) and c0 ≤ θ̂. Then there is an SPNE of G(c0, p1)
where the Cournot outcome is played (Lemma SII(1)). In this SPNE, firm 1 obtains φ1(c0).
We prove the result by showing firm 1 does not have a gainful unilateral deviation. If firm
1 deviates to p′1 > τ(c0), it would still obtain φ1(c0). If it deviates to p
′
1 < τ(c0), it would
obtain F (p′1) < F (τ(c0)) (by the monotonicity of F ). Since c0 ≤ θ̂, we have F (τ(c0)) ≤ φ1(c0)
(Lemma 5(v)), so this deviation is not gainful. Finally, if firm 1 deviates to p′1 = τ(c0), then it
obtains either φ1(c0) (the Cournot outcome) or F (τ(c0)) ≤ φ1(c0) (the Stackelberg outcome),
so this deviation is not gainful as well. This completes the proof of the “if” part.
The “only if” part: By (ii), p1 ≥ τ(c0) in any SPNE. Under the Cournot outcome, firm
1 obtains φ1(c0). By deviating to p
′
1 > p1 ≥ τ(c0), firm 1 obtains F (p′1) which can be made
arbitrarily close to F (τ(c0)) by choosing p
′
1 sufficiently close to p1. To ensure that firm 1’s
deviation is not gainful for any p′1 ∈ (0, p1), we need φ1(c0) ≥ F (τ(c0)), so by Lemma 5(v)
we must have c0 ≤ θ̂.
(iv)(b) The “if” part: Let p1 = τ(c0) and c0 ≥ θ̂. Then there is an SPNE of G(c0, p1)
where the Stackelberg outcome is played. In this SPNE, firm 1 obtains F (p1) = F (τ(c0)).
We prove the result by showing that firm 1 does not have a gainful unilateral deviation.
If firm 1 deviates to p′1 > p1 = τ(c0), it would obtain φ1(c0). Since c0 ≥ θ̂, by Lemma
5(v), φ1(c0) ≤ F (τ(c0)) = F (p1), so this deviation is not gainful. If firm 1 deviates to
p′1 ∈ [0, c1), it would obtain less than φ1(c1) (see the proof of Lemma 4(ii)) which is less
than φ1(c0) ≤ F (p1). Finally if it deviates to p′1 ∈ [c1, p1), it would obtain F (p′1) and by the
monotonicity of F , such a deviation is also not gainful.
The “only if” part: By (ii), p1 ≥ τ(c0) in any SPNE. If p1 > τ(c0), then there is no
SPNE of G(c0, p1) where the Stackelberg outcome is played (Lemma SII(2)), therefore if the
Stackelberg outcome is played in an SPNE, we must have p1 = τ(c0). Under the Stackelberg
outcome, firm 1 obtains F (p1) = F (τ(c0)). If firm 1 deviates to p
′
1 > p1 = τ(c0), it would
obtain φ1(c0). To ensure that this deviation is not gainful, we need φ1(c0) ≤ F (τ(c0)), so by
Lemma 5(v), we must have c0 ≥ θ̂. 
5.5 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1 (I) Let c0 ∈ (c1, θ̂). Then there is no SPNE of Γ where the Stackelberg
outcome is played (Lemma SI, part (iii)(b)) and a continuum of SPNE (indexed by (p0, p1)
where p0 ∈ [c0, θ̂] and p1 = τ(p0)) where the Cournot outcome is played (Lemma SI, part
(iii)(a)). The outsourcing pattern under the Cournot outcome follows from Lemma SII(1).
(II) Let c0 ∈ (θ̂, (a + c1)/2). Then there is no SPNE of Γ where the Cournot outcome
is played (Lemma SI, part (iii)(a)) and a continuum of SPNE (indexed by (p0, p1) where
p0 ∈ [θ̂, c0] and p1 = τ(p0)) where the Stackelberg outcome is played (Lemma SI, part
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(iii)(b)). The outsourcing pattern under the Stackelberg outcome follows from Lemma SII(1).
(III) Let c0 = θ̂. Then by part (iii) of Lemma SI, there are two SPNE of Γ, one where the
Cournot outcome is played and one where the Stackelberg outcome is played, each having
p0 = c0 = θ̂ and p1 = τ(c0). The outsourcing pattern again follows from Lemma SII(1). 
Proof of Theorem 2 (I) Let c0 ∈ (c1, θ̂). Then there is no SPNE of Γ˜ where the Stackelberg
outcome is played (Lemma SI, part (iv)(b)) and a continuum of SPNE, indexed by p1 ∈
[τ(c0),∞), where the Cournot outcome is played (Lemma SI, part (iv)(a)). The outsourcing
pattern under the Cournot outcome follows from Lemma SII(1). As firm 2 does not order
any input from firm 1 in any of these SPNE, they are equivalent in real terms.
(II) Let c0 >∈ (θ̂, (a + c1)/2). Then there is a unique SPNE of Γ˜ where p1 = τ(c0) and
the Stackelberg outcome is played (Lemma SI, part (iv)). The outsourcing pattern under
the Stackelberg outcome follows from Lemma SII(1).
(III) Let c0 = θ̂. By Lemma SI(iv), there is one SPNE where p1 = τ(c0) and the Stackel-
berg outcome is played and a continuum of SPNE, indexed by p1 ∈ [τ(c0),∞) and equivalent
in real terms, where the Cournot outcome is played. The outsourcing pattern again follows
from Lemma SII(1). 
6 Discussion and extensions
6.1 Credible commitment versus public announcement
When firm 2 orders q12 units of the intermediate good η from firm 1, this constitutes a contract
between the two parties, whereby 2 is able to credibly commit itself to the purchase of q12
while 1 credibly commits to supply q12 to firm 2. Were one party to renege on its purchase
or sale, the other party would have recourse to the signed contract to take it to task.
The situation is quite different when firm 1 simply announces that it will produce q11
units for itself. If 1 were to renege, would 1 take itself to task? In the absence of an external
enforcement agency (like a courthouse), where 1 could go and write a binding contract to
produce q11 or else be liable for severe punishment, 1’s announcement is simply that: just
“cheap talk” and not a credible commitment.
We rule out the possibility of such binding contracts in our model. Thus if we envisage
the game where, anxious to be a Stackelberg leader, firm 1 first announces q11 and then firm
2 comes to it to order q12, 1 will always be free to change its mind later regarding q
1
1 upon
hearing q12. This fact is common knowledge to all the players. Hence every subgame that
follows an announcement by 1, is still Γ(c0, c1, a). Since we are looking at Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibria, adding the initial announcements will have no effect and the same equilibria
will occur in the subgames as before.
Were an external agency in place to enable 1 to make credible commitments,16 our analysis
would no longer hold and it may well be possible for 1 to emerge as a Stackelberg leader,
with 2 outsourcing to 1. But our model rules out such a mechanism.
16Since we have linear costs and unbounded capacity, there is no autonomous costly action (such as building
up excess capacity a` la Dixit, 1980) that 1 can undertake to signal its commitment. An external agency is
needed for this purpose.
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6.2 The secrecy clause
It is crucial to our analysis that the quantity outsourced by any firm j = 1, 2 to 0 cannot be
observed by the rival firm. This can be justified on the ground that outsourcing contracts
in practice do incorporate secrecy (non-disclosure) clauses (see, e.g., Temponi and Lambert,
2001; Ravenhill, 2003; Hoecht and Trott, 2006). In fact, in many cases it is legally binding
to have such clauses. Offshore outsourcing contracts are likely to come under the general
purview of international trade laws that ensure protection of confidential information. For
example, Article 39 of the agreement of TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights) of The World Trade Organization states:17
“Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully
within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without
their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices...so long as such
information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not...generally known among or readily accessible to
persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully
in control of the information, to keep it secret.”
Turning more specifically to outsourcing contracts, there is evidence of widespread use of the
secrecy clause. For example, in his study of projects outsourced to Kuwait, Khalfan (2004:
61) states that:
“Data confidentiality should be viewed as a critical element by the different parties,
and therefore should be respected by the vendor throughout the contracting period
and after termination. Taking into consideration that a particular vendor may work
simultaneously with two competing organisations, extra caution must therefore be
exercised to ensure that data confidentiality is not compromised...”
Discussing data protection laws of the European Union in the context of outsourcing, Vagadia
(2007: 121) also points out:
“Each party should recognize that under the agreement it may receive or become ap-
praised of information belonging or relating to the other, including information concern-
ing business and marketing plans...Each party should agree...not to divulge confidential
information belonging to the other to any third party...”
The secrecy clause is indeed widely used in practice, which is why we took it be exogenously
given in our model. However, it can often be deduced to hold endogenously in equilibrium
(in appropriately “enlarged” games). Indeed suppose that the quantity q outsourced by 2
to 0 can be made “public” (and hence observable by 1) or else kept “secret” between 2 and
0. We argue that a public contract can never occur (be active) at an SPNE, as long as the
game provides sufficient “strategic freedom” to its various players. For suppose it did occur:
1 knew that 2 buys q units of η from 0 at price p0. Thus 1 is a Stackelberg follower in the
17Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm
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final market α, regardless of whom 2 chooses to outsource η to. It would be better for 1
to quote a lower price p0 − ε for η. This would be certain to lure 2 to outsource to 1. But
p0 ≥ c0, since 0 could not be making losses at the presumed SPNE; hence p0 − ε > c1 for
small enough ε (recall c0 > c1). By manoeuvering 2’s order to itself, firm 1 thus earns a
significant profit on the manufacture of η. It does lose a little on the market for α, because
2 has a lower cost p0 − ε of η (compared to the p0 earlier), but the loss is of the order of ε.
Thus 1 has made a profitable unilateral deviation, contradicting that we were at an SPNE.
Note that our argument relies on the fact that 1 has the strategic freedom to “counter”
the public contract. If, furthermore, 0 also has the freedom to reject the public contract and
counter it with a secret contract, then—foreseeing the above deviation by firm 1—firm 0 will
only opt for secret contracts.
The most simple instance of such an enlarged game is obtained by inserting an initial
binary move by 0 at the start of our game Γ. This represents a declaration by 0 as to whether
its offer to 2 is by way of a public or a secret contract. The game Γ follows 0’s declaration.
It is easy to verify that any SPNE of the enlarged game must have 0 choosing “secret”,
followed by an SPNE of Γ. Of course, more complicated enlarged games can be thought of.
For example, after the simultaneous announcement of p0 and p1 in our game Γ, suppose firm
2 has the option to choose “Public q” or ”Secret q” in the event that it goes to 0, followed
by “Accept” or “Reject” by 0. Clearly 1 finds out q only if “Public q” and “Accept” are
chosen. On the other hand, if 0 chooses “Reject” we (still having to complete the definition
of the enlarged game) could suppose that 2’s order of η is automatically directed to 1. This
game is more complex to analyze, but our argument above still applies and shows that a
public contract will never be played out in any SPNE.
We thus see that the secrecy clause can often emerge endogenously from strategic con-
siderations, even though—for simplicity—we postulated it in our model. It is apparent that
the firm placing orders (firm 2 in our model) may demand secrecy in order to protect sen-
sitive information from leaking out to its rivals and destroying its competitive advantage.
Our analysis reveals that the firm taking the orders (i.e., firm 0) may also—for more subtle
strategic reasons—have a vested interest in maintaining the secrecy clause.
6.3 Price competition
One key issue is the extent to which our main result is sensitive to the mode of competition.18
Our result turns on the fact that when a non-integrated firm (firm 2 in our model) outsources
inputs to its vertically integrated rival (firm 1), then 2 automatically becomes a Stackelberg
leader in the market α for the final good, which stands to 2’s advantage because of the
quantity competition on α. But what if there was price competition instead on market α?
Would the Stackelberg “leadership premium” for 2 still obtain?
Much depends on the timing of moves, and the flow of information. In the current
literature (e.g., Chen 2001; Chen et al., 2004; Arya et al., 2008b), it is assumed that 2
outsources inputs to 1 after both have set prices and solicited demand on the final good
market, and made it common knowledge. Under this assumption, the Stackelberg effect
disappears. But if there is a gestation period of any significance in converting inputs into
the final product, then this assumption is no longer viable, and it is more reasonable to
18We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
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suppose that inputs are outsourced and paid for upfront before the competition begins on
the market α for the final good (at least as long as we contemplate “spot”, not “futures”,
markets for the final good). The outsourcing order (by 2 to its vertically-integrated rival 1)
then becomes tantamount to a “capacity” build-up by 2 prior to price competition on market
α. This in turn has the effect of indirectly establishing 2 as Stackelberg leader, provided
that the costs of 1 are sufficiently below those of alternative input suppliers that 2 could
avail of on the outside. (We omit all details, but see the recent paper by Pierce and Sen
(2009), where a detailed analysis is carried out along these lines in the context of a Hotelling
duopoly on market α). To sum up: the Stackelberg effect, and thus also our main result,
remains intact even in the presence of price competition as long as the vertically-integrated
rival’s costs for producing inputs are sufficiently lower than those of the outside firms.
6.4 Alternative pricing schemes
The pricing scheme we have considered in our model is unit-based, i.e., an input provider
charges a constant price for each unit that it supplies. Although other schemes such as flat
fees and profit-sharing arrangements are sometimes used in outsourcing, unit-based pricing is
the most prevalent (see, e.g., Barthe´lemy, 2003; Robinson and Kalakota, 2004 and Vagadia,
2007).
Not surprisingly, many papers (for instance, most of those that we have cited) are based
on unit pricing. However, it is important to go beyond this benchmark and investigate
alternative pricing schemes and their influence on the pattern of outsourcing. This is an
issue that we hope to take up in future work.
6.5 Variations of the model
Our model can be varied in many ways, but the essential theme remains intact: if O’s costs
are not much higher than I’s, J will outsource to O. Here we briefly indicate a few possible
variations.
6.5.1 Economies of scale
When there are increasing, instead of constant, returns to scale in the manufacture of the
intermediate good η, a new strategic consideration arises, though it does not affect the
tenor of our results. The primary strategic incentive to outsource to the outside firm 0 can
shift from firm 1 to firm 2. For now 2 must worry that if it outsources η to 1, then 1 will
develop a cost advantage on account of economies of scale. In other words, 1 will be able to
manufacture η for itself at an average cost that is significantly lower than what it charges to
2. This might outweigh any leadership advantage that 2 obtains by going to 1. So, foreseeing
a competitor in 1 that is fierce inspite of being a follower, 2 would prefer to outsource to 0
as long as 0’s price is not too much above 1’s. This, in turn, will happen if 0’s costs are not
significantly higher than 1’s. But then, if 2 is outsourcing to 0, economies of scale can drive
1 to outsource to 0 as well!
These two strategic considerations, the first impelling 1 to push 2 towards 0 and the
second impelling 2 to turn away from 1 on its own and to seek out 0, are intermingled in the
presence of economies of scale. It is hard to disentangle them and say precisely when one
29
fades out, leaving spotlight on the other. But by eliminating economies of scale altogether,
we were able to focus on just the first scenario, wherein the game turns essentially on the
informational content of the strategies.
Economies of scale can easily be incorporated in our model. Suppose the average cost
ci(q) of manufacturing q units of η falls (as q rises) for both i = 0, 1. For simplicity, suppose
ci(q) falls linearly and that c0(q) = λc1(q) for some positive scalar
19 λ. It can then be shown
that there exists a threshold λ∗ > 1 such that if λ < λ∗:
(i) firm 2 outsources to firm 0 in any SPNE,
(ii) both firms 1 and 2 outsource to firm 0 in any SPNE when economies of scale are not
too small.
This result is established in Chen and Dubey (2009).20
6.5.2 Discriminatory pricing
The outsourcing result for increasing returns hinges on the fact that 0 cannot quote discrim-
inatory21 provider prices to 1 and 2, otherwise 0 could benefit by setting different prices in
sequence to 1 and 2.
One reason firm 1 might conceivably buy η from 0, at a price necessarily as high as c0 (and
therefore higher than its own cost c1), is to make public its order and become a Stackelberg
leader vis-a-vis 2. But this is ruled out by the secrecy clause.
Alternatively, firm 1 may decide to buy its inputs from 0 in order to influence 0’s pricing
to its rival firm 2. This line of reasoning has been formally developed in Arya et al (2008a)
as follows. The outside supplier 0 offers its input prices to firms 1 and 2 in sequence. In
this setting, when firm 1 places its input orders with firm 0, it is in 0’s interest to ensure
high sales for 1 in the market α for the final good. This induces firm 0 to set a high input
price for firm 2 subsequent to the deal 0 has struck with 1. Thus the overall effect is that,
by ordering first from 0, firm 1 effectively raises the cost of its rival firm 2. This result in
Arya et al (2008a) is driven by their critical assumption that firm 1 must commit on its
“make-or-buy” decision before 0 sets its input price for 2. In contrast, in our model, we
impose no such advance exclusivity commitment: firm 1 can buy its inputs from 0 as well
as make them in-house. When 1 is given this flexibility, it will not purchase from 0 because
the equilibrium price offered by 0 cannot be less than c0 > c1. Foreseeing that firm 1 will
produce its inputs entirely in-house, the incentive for firm 0 to favor 1 by setting a high price
for 2 will disappear in our setting.
19Thus c1(q) = max{0, c− bq} and c0(q) = λmax{0, c− bq} for positive scalars b, c, λ.
20It is needed here that the economies of scale be not too pronounced, otherwise pure strategy SPNE
may fail to exist. More precisely, for the average cost function c1(q) =max{0, c − bq}, it is assumed that
0 < b < c/2a to guarantee (i) the existence of pure strategy SPNE and (ii) in equilibrium, the quantity
produced entails positive marginal cost.
21Note that in our main model discriminatory prices are of no avail on account of constant returns to
scale: firm 1 will always produce η by itself at a lower cost c1 and ignore 0’s offer.
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6.5.3 Multiple firms of each type
Suppose there are n1, n2 replicas of firms 1 and 2. The timing of moves is assumed to be
as before, with the understanding that all replicas of a firm move simultaneously wherever
that firm had moved in the original game. Restricting attention to type-symmetric SPNE,
Theorem 1 again remains intact with a lower threshold in terms of the value of θ̂(c1).
6.5.4 Only outside suppliers
The strategic incentives that we have analyzed can arise in other contexts. Suppose, for
instance, that 1 and 2 both need to outsource the supply of the intermediate good η to
outsiders O = {O1, O2, . . .}. If 2 goes first to O and 1 knows which Oi has received 2’s order,
then 1 will have incentive to outsource to some Oj that is distinct from Oi, even if Oj’s costs
are higher than Oi’s, so long as they are not much higher. For if 1 went to Oi, it might have
to infer the size of 2’s orders and thus be obliged to become a Stackelberg follower (e.g.,
because Oi has limited capacity and can attend to 1’s order only after fully servicing the
prior order of 2). Alternatively, even if 1 does not know who 2 has outsourced to, or indeed
if 2 has outsourced at all, it may be safer for 1 to spread its order among several firms in O
so that it minimizes the probability of becoming 2’s follower. We leave the precise modeling
and analysis of such situations for future research.
Appendix: the functions τ and θ̂
For the sake of completeness, we give the formulae for the functions τ, θ̂ that appear in the
statements of Theorems 1 and 2 (they are derived in Section 5).
Define τ1, τ2 : [c1, (a+ c1)/2]→ R+ as
τ1(p0) := 4p0(a+ c1 − p0)/3(a+ c1) and τ2(p0) := (3− 2
√
2)(a+ c1)/6 + 2
√
2p0/3
Denote
θ(c1) := (
√
2− 1)(a+ c1)/2
√
2
The function τ(p0) is the continuous and increasing function defined by
τ(p0) =
{
τ1(p0) if p0 < θ(c1)
τ2(p0) if p0 ≥ θ(c1)
Define θ0(c1, c0) := c0/2 + (a+ c1)/4 and
θ̂1(c1) :=
[
4c1 + a−
√
a2 − 7ac1 + c21
]
/5 and θ̂2(c1) := a/14 + 13c1/14
Let ρ ≡ 23/[121 + 84√2]. Define the continuous function θ̂ by
θ̂(c1) :=
{
θ̂1(c1) if c1 < ρa
θ̂2(c1) if c1 ≥ ρa
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